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Comment  Janice C. Eberly
This chapter brings rigorous quantitative evaluation to an important policy 
topic, and hence it is hard to quarrel with either the motivation or the execu-
tion. Student lending is important both as a Federal budget item and as a 
component of household balance sheets (as I argue later). Moreover, student 
loans are an instrument of access to higher education. Largely as a result of 
these programs, some prominent researchers argue that ﬁ  nancing should no 
longer be considered a barrier to college enrollment (Carneiro and Heckman 
2005). Nonetheless, policymakers should remain vigilant about the cost and 
eﬃciency of the programs that provide this access.
The chapter makes three contributions. First, it provides a primer on 
student lending programs, which are large and ubiquitous in higher educa-
tion in the United States. Second, the chapter makes an important techni-
cal contribution by calculating the cost of student loans in the main fed-
eral programs. This is a substantial undertaking because of the complexity 
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and opaque measurement of these programs. Finally, the chapter explores 
policy implications by comparing the direct lending and guaranteed loan 
programs. The former provides ﬁ  nancing for student loans directly from 
the government, while the guaranteed or Federal Family Education Loan 
Program (FFELP) provides a federal guarantee to loans originated and 
held privately.
My comments focus on three issues raised by the chapter. First, why 
are student loans an important segment to understand? Student loans 
represent a large and growing segment of household debt. This category 
of household liabilities is relatively new, at least in its current form, but 
composes more than 40 percent of household debt for young households 
(age of household head less than thirty-  ﬁ  ve). Second, because of the struc-
ture of federal loan programs, valuing the outstanding liabilities is not 
easy. The valuation project undertaken by this chapter is challenging, but 
important and useful to understand the nature of the instruments held by 
the federal government, as well as liabilities incurred by students. Finally, 
there are policy implications for education ﬁ  nance, which is largely a 
government-  owned or sponsored activity. The chapter suggests that direct 
lending is substantially cheaper to the government than the guaranteed 
loan program through private ﬁ  nancial institutions. Recent legislation 
has tended to move in the direction suggested by the chapter, in cutting 
the subsidy payments to the institutions that originate and distribute the 
guaranteed loans.
The Importance of Student Loans
Student loan programs loom large for both borrowers and lenders. From 
the government’s point of view, the annual cash commitment is large, as 
is the liability that the government takes on by either holding or guarantee-
ing the loans. Quantifying the size of this liability is also one of the goals of 
this chapter. Similarly, the amount of debt taken on by student borrowers is 
substantial. Student loan debt is becoming a visible presence in household 
balance sheets.
Debbie and Damien’s chapter describes the quantity of debt from the 
government’s and lenders’ perspective, which was $380 billion in 2005. Here 
I focus on the student level. The average federal student loan debt among 
2004 graduating seniors is $19,202 (Staﬀord and Perkins loans); adding in 
parent loans (PLUS) takes the total to $21,814. For graduate and profes-
sional students, the debt level doubles, on average (see table 7C.1).
Looking at student lending in the context of household balance sheets, 
it is helpful to ﬁ  rst start with total household debt, using data from the 
Survey of Consumer Finances. Median total household debt has almost 
doubled from $22,000 to $38,000 from 1989 to 2004 (in real 2004 dollars). 
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forty-   to ﬁ  fty-  year-  olds, and is in the form of collateralized mortgage debt. 
Education debt is not broadly held, though the share of households with 
holdings has risen from nine percent to 14 percent from 1989 to 2004, and 
both the median level of education debt and the mean have doubled; the 
mean has risen from $8,000 to $16,000 per household. However, these aggre-
gate values mask the concentration of debt among younger households, 
who have experienced the run-  up in student lending. Among households 
under age thirty- ﬁ  ve, almost 30 percent have student loans (see ﬁ  gure 7C.1). 
Among these households, the median level of education debt is $9,000, 
which is more than 40 percent of their total debt (the median level of total 
debt is $22,000).
The data also indicate that education debt is concentrated among the 
lowest wealth households. Keep in mind that student loans are not means-
  tested and are unsecured debt. If the investment in education pays oﬀ, then 
this is not necessarily bad—presumably, higher education generally leads to 
higher future income. There is strong evidence of the return to education in 
the large literature documenting the education skill premium.
It is more diﬃcult to document how well students understand the obli-
gations they assume when they take on an education loan. The terms are 
often far from transparent, and may include conditions that depend on the 
student’s payment history. Moreover, student loans are not discharged in 
bankruptcy, and it is very diﬃcult to default on student loan debt. Consider 
the following exchange on a student loan question-  and-  answer website (the 
following adapted from www.WikiAnswers.com). Question: “How long 
before outstanding student loans are forgiven?” Answer: “It doesn’t matter 
Table 7C.1  2004 education debt
Graduate education debt
All education debt 
(Grad and Undergrad)
Graduate and professional 









Total 60.1 37,067 70.1 42,406
Master’s degree 58.4 26,895 69.3 32,858
Doctoral degree 51.0 49,007 58.3 53,405
Professional degree 86.5 82,688 88.4 93,134
MBA 53.0 35,525 63.6 41,687
MSW 76.5 27,136 81.0 37,029
PhD 40.0 36,917 46.8 41,540
EdD 53.4 49,050 65.7 47,725
Law (LLB or JD) 87.7 70,933 89.7 80,754
Medicine   95.0   113,661   95.0   125,819
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how long you had the loan, you have to pay it back unless you are disabled, a 
teacher in low- income schools, part of the peace corps, or the school forged 
your signature.” In fact, the Department of Education regularly garnishes 
the wages and tax refunds of borrowers who fail to make their payments on 
federal loans. Garnishment is limited to 15 percent of disposable income, 
and continues until the debt is fully repaid.
A Sketch of Student Lending Programs: Direct and Guaranteed
The Federal government currently oﬀers two parallel systems for stu-
dents to ﬁ  nance higher education. In both cases, the Government sets the 
terms of the student loan (interest rate, maturity, deferment options, etc.), 
so the terms of the two government programs are broadly the same from 
a borrower’s viewpoint. The administration and ﬁ  nancing of the two loan 
programs, however, are quite diﬀerent.
In the direct lending program, the government makes the loan directly to 
the student and services the loan through a third-  party servicer.
In the guaranteed lending program a “bank” or other ﬁ  nancial institution 
originates and services the loan to the student. The government pays the 
bank a ﬂ  oating rate plus a premium, to compensate the lender for the cost of 
funds, plus the preferential loan terms of student loans and for administra-
Fig. 7C.1    2004 percent of families with education debt, by age of head of 
household
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tive costs. The government compensates the lender 97 percent of principal 
if the student defaults.1
The Staﬀord loan is one of the largest guaranteed student loan programs. 
Congress sets the interest rate, pegged to a ﬂ  oating rate until 2006, now ﬁ  xed. 
The “ﬁ  rst hundred hours” legislation in 2007 halved this rate. The loans 
have a basic maturity of ten years, but this can be extended to up to thirty 
years under various programs. Staﬀord loans can either be “subsidized” 
loans or “unsubsidized.” The government pays the interest accumulation 
on a subsidized loan while the student is in school or defers payment. The 
subsidy is need-  based and borrowing is capped at $23,000 for undergradu-
ates, and $65,500 for graduate students. The student pays all the interest 
on an unsubsidized loan, and the total borrowing is capped at $23,000 for 
undergraduates and $138,500 for graduate students (total, including any 
undergraduate borrowing).
Because the total cost of education can easily exceed the caps on Staﬀord 
loans, Congress has also created the “PLUS” loan, or Parent Loan. This 
program allows parents to borrow on behalf of undergraduate dependents. 
The interest rate is ﬁ  xed at 8.5 percent, and the maturity varies from ten to 
thirty years. The PLUS program was recently extended to graduate educa-
tion. Prior to this extension, adult graduate and professional students typi-
cally turned to the private loan market to ﬁ  nance their educations in excess 
of the caps on Federal Staﬀord loans. The introduction of the PLUS loan 
for graduate and professional students greatly reduced demand for these 
private loans.
The private loan program is the ﬁ  nal source of education debt ﬁ  nancing. 
There is no government guarantee, but the loans are not dismissed in bank-
ruptcy (as of 2005). These loans are privately oﬀered by ﬁ  nancial institutions 
in a very competitive market. Because there is no federal back up, these 
loans provide a market benchmark against which to compare the federal 
programs. This is a key component of the analysis of the government pro-
grams, since the private market provides an estimate of the market interest 
rate for student loans.
Comparing Private versus Federal Loans: 
How Big is the Subsidy and Who Gets It?
The presence of these three loan programs—direct lending, guaranteed 
loans, and private loans—allows a three-  way comparison of private versus 
the two government loan programs. In particular, using the private loans 
as a benchmark, Debbie and Damien estimate how heavily subsidized 
the federal loans are. Moreover, they can then compare the subsidies and 
costs embedded in the two federal loans and compare their costs to the 
1. This amount can vary depending on the servicer, and at times was as high as 99 percent. 
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government. Speciﬁ  cally, the government pays nothing for private loans. For 
direct loans it pays the diﬀerence between the market interest rate and the 
interest rate that the student pays, plus any subsidized interest, plus its own 
administrative costs. For guaranteed loans, the government pays the princi-
pal if the loan defaults, plus payments to the originators to compensate them 
for the subsidized interest rate, as well as their administrative costs.
The approach in the chapter compares government cash outﬂ  ows to the 
cash inﬂ  ows in each of the Federal programs, taking present values using 
the appropriate cost of capital. A direct loan has the simplest cash ﬂ  ows: the 
Federal government disburses the loan and incurs administrative servicing 
costs, eventually receiving loan payments back, subject to deferrals, consoli-
dation, early repayment, or default. The present value of the cash inﬂ  ows 
(repayments) minus the cash outﬂ  ow (the initial loan amount) gives the cost 
of the loan. Since the loans are oﬀered at a below-  market interest rate, this 
calculation is usually equal to a negative number, giving the present value 
of the subsidy to the student borrower.
The cash ﬂ  ows made by the government to support guaranteed loans are 
trickier. In this case the “bank” obtains ﬁ  nancing privately and disburses 
it to the student. The bank incurs marketing and administrative costs, ser-
vices the loan (or obtains a third party to do so), and receives repayments, 
subject to deferrals, consolidation, early repayment, or default. Government 
payments are made to the bank to defray its administrative costs and the 
subsidized interest rate, and the government also makes the guarantee pay-
ment in the case of student default. (Banks also make some payments back 
to the government, but we will focus on the net payment from the govern-
ment to the bank.)
From the results in the chapter’s table 7.5, consider a typical $25,000 
debt with a twenty-  year term: it costs the government $3,375 (13.5 percent) 
unsubsidized in direct lending and $6,325 in the guaranteed program. If 
subsidized, these numbers jump to $6,750 and $9,250, respectively. First, 
note that even the unsubsidized loan is subsidized; the government pays 
13.5 percent of the cost of the loan. If we assume that the $3,375 cost in the 
direct lending program represents the cost of the preferential borrowing rate, 
plus reasonable administrative costs, then the student’s cost is $3,375 lower 
than it would be for a similar private loan. The cost to the government to 
make the same loan through the guaranteed loan program is almost twice as 
high—$6,328—and the student receives fundamentally the same product.
The obvious question to ask then is what happens to the additional $2,953, 
or 12 percentage points, in costs paid by the government to ﬁ  nancial insti-
tutions to make guaranteed loans? Financial institutions may have higher 
costs than the direct lending program (due to a higher cost of capital or 
operational ineﬃciencies, for example). Originating and distributing federal 
student loans is a very competitive business, so it is likely (as Debbie and 
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competition. The extra cost could be spent on marketing, or in “sweeteners” 
to students that improve the borrowing terms; say, through a discounted 
interest rate for on- time payments or electronic withdrawals. This decompo-
sition does not aﬀect the subsidy to guaranteed lending, but it does change 
how one thinks about the incidence of costs. If the extra cost for guaranteed 
lending is due to higher ﬁ  nancing/  operating costs or marketing expenses, 
there is little payoﬀ to the government of using guaranteed lending. If, on 
the other hand, the payments go to improved terms for borrowers, then the 
additional government cost is passed along to student borrowers. In this 
case, the guaranteed loan program is more expensive to the government, but 
the student borrowers receive a better loan.
Policy Implications and Responses
To the extent that the guaranteed program is more expensive to the gov-
ernment than direct lending, without passing through the beneﬁ  ts to stu-
dents, the guaranteed program is simply more costly to the government 
without beneﬁ  tting students. Not surprisingly, the program has been under 
increased scrutiny. The most recent reauthorization of the Higher Educa-
tion Act in 2007 improved loan terms to students by halving the interest 
rate, and also cut payments to lenders. The former, as indicated in Debbie 
and Damien’s table 7.8, dramatically increases the subsidy to students—by 
a factor of 2 even under direct lending. The reduction in payments to ﬁ  nan-
cial institutions has caused a large number of lenders to cease participation 
in the guaranteed lending program, leading to a substantial shift to direct 
lending.
These changes may indicate a change in the federal lending model, elimi-
nating the dual approach, in which direct and guaranteed lending programs 
coexist, and instead moving toward a model in which all student loan ﬁ  nanc-
ing is provided by the federal government. Even under direct lending, servic-
ing is generally privately provided through third-  party servicing contracts 
with the government. Origination could also follow a contracting model, 
where ﬁ  nancial institutions originate loans and sell them to the government 
(as has occurred with the disruption in ﬁ  nancial markets in 2008). This 
model preserves some of the potential beneﬁ  ts of competition in origina-
tion and servicing, while eliminating what Debbie and Damien identify as 
wasteful subsidies in the guaranteed lending program.
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